



Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local
100' marks the most recent attempt by the United States Supreme
Court to apply the standards of the Sherman Antitrust Act 2 to the
activities of labor unions. The Court in Connell attempts to harmo-
nize the anticompetitive policies of the Sherman Act with the policies
of the federal labor statutes3 favoring collective bargaining between
unions and employers.4 Connell, unfortunately, follows the pattern of
1 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
2 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970) [hereinafter cited as the
Sherman Act]:
§ i. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal . . . . Every person who shall make any contract or engage
in any combination or conspiracy declared by sections 1-7 of this title to be illegal
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be pun-
ished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding
one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
§ 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
§ 4. The several district courts of the United States are invested with jurisdiction
to prevent and restrain violations [of this act]; and it shall be the duty of the several
United States attorneys, in their respective districts, under the direction of the Attor-
ney General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations.
Such proceedings may be by way of petition setting forth the case and praying that
such violation shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. When the parties com-
plained of shall have been duly notified of such petition the court shall proceed, as
soon as may be, to the hearing and determination of the case; and pending such
petition and before final decree, the court may at any time make such temporary
restraining order or prohibition as shall be deemed just in the premises.
§ 7. The word "person", or "persons", wherever used in [this act] shall be
deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the
laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any
State, or the laws of any foreign country.
3 The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited
as the NLRA].
I See Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616,
622 (1975). For extensive analyses of the history and application of the antitrust laws to labor
activities, see e.g., E. BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT (1930); F. FRANKFURTER AND
N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930); Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Prelimi-
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earlier Court attempts in that it fails to articulate clear principles for
the application of the Sherman Act within the context of union-
employer agreements.5
This note gives a brief history of the Supreme Court decisions
prior to Connell, a statement of that case, and finally, a discussion
of the extent to which the Connell antitrust opinion departs from that
of earlier cases.
II. LABOR'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION BEFORE Connell
A combination of business organizations that attempts to set the
terms by which a tradesman may have access to the business market
constitutes a per se violation of the Sherman Act irrespective of the
combination's ultimate purpose or effect.' Yet, this kind of restraint
is the goal of every union organization engaged in primary or second-
ary activities in the course of a labor dispute.7 Further, a successful
union organizational campaign within a particular locale will make
it increasingly difficult for nonunion firms to compete within the
market.8
The Sherman Act by its terms does not exempt union activity
or the mere existence of a union organization from its broad proscrip-
tion of combinations in restraint of interstate commerce. Therefore,
in determining whether particular union activity violated the Sher-
man Act, early Supreme Court decisions9 frequently considered the
extent to which interstate trade had been disrupted, based on a com-
paratively narrow concept of interstate commerce." Local work stop-
pages in support of union demands were permissible to the extent that
nary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 252 (1955); Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining,
and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHi. L. REv. 659 (1965); Winter, Collective Bargaining and
Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Winter].
See generally, Winter, supra note 4.
Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Eastern States Retail Lumber
Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
7 Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 252,
255-56 (1955).
9 See Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616,
625 (1975).
1 E.g., Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927);
Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925); United Mine Workers v.
Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443
(1921); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
20 E.g., Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103 (1933); Industrial Ass'n v.
United States, 268 U.S. 64 (1925); United Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co.,
265 U.S. 457 (1924); United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
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the union sought only to resolve a labor dispute with a particular
employer." However, the local dispute might blossom into a direct
restraint in violation of the Sherman Act if evidence showed that the
union's purpose was to eliminate the competitive threat posed by the
presence of the employer's nonunion goods in the product market.,2
In 1914 Congress passed the Clayton Act.1 3 Section 6 provided
United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 346, 411 (1922).
12 Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 296, 310 (1925).
13 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970):
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That "antitrust laws," as used herein, includes
the Act entitled "An Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints
and monopolies," approved July second, eighteen hundred and ninety [The Sherman
Act] ....
§ 6. That the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and
operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the
purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to
forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying
out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members
thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint
of trade, under the antitrust laws.
§ 16. That any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue
for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction
over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust
laws, including sections two, three, seven and eight of this Act, when and under the
same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that
will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing
such proceedings, and upon the execution of proper bond against damages for an
injunction improvidently granted and a showing that the danger of irreparable loss
or damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction may issue: Provided, That nothing
herein contained shall be construed to entitle any person, firm, corporation, or
association, except the United States, to bring suit in equity for injunctive relief
against any common carrier subject to the provisions of the Act to regulate com-
merce, approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, in respect of
any matter subject to the regulation, supervision, or other jurisdiction of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission.
§ 20. That no restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of
the United States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an employer
and employees, or between employers and employees, or between employees, or
between persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing
out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions or employment, unless necessary to
prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a property right, of the party making
the application, for which injury there is no adequate remedy at law, and such
property or property right must be described with particularity in the application,
which must be in writing and sworn to by the applicant or by his agent or attorney.
And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or persons,
whether singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment, or from
ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or persuad-
ing others by peaceful means so to do; or from attending at any place where any
such person or persons may lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or
NOTES
that "the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of
commerce," that the existence of a union was not a violation of the
antitrust laws, and that the Sherman Act was not to be construed to
prevent individual union members from "lawfully carrying out the
legitimate objects thereof." What some observers saw as a victory for
the union movement," was soon transformed into a crushing defeat
with the Supreme Court's decision in Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering.5 In Duplex the court interpreted § 6 of the Clayton Act to
be a mere codification of existing law, the terms "lawfully" and
"legitimately" being interpreted as allowing only union activity in
furtherance of objects that were legal under the Sherman Act. 6 Simi-
larly, § 20 of the Clayton Act, which listed particular union activities
deemed non-violative of federal law, was construed by the Court to
apply only to actions involving an employer and his own employees.7
Thus the application of the Sherman Act to union activities pro-
ceeded much as it had before, with Duplex effectively committing the
federal courts to the role of arbiters of the propriety of the objects of
union activity."
communicating information, or from peacefully persuading any person to work or
abstain from working, or from ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to such
dispute, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful and
lawful means so to do; or from paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person
engaged in such dispute, any strike benefits or other moneys or things of value; or
from peaceably assembling in a lawful manner, and for lawful purposes; or from
doing any act or thing which might lawfully be done in the absence of such dispute
by any party thereto; nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be consid-
ered or held to be violations of any law of the United States.
" Samuel Gompers, for one, had characterized the Clayton Act as the "Industrial Magna
Charta." See E. WITTE, THE GOVERNMENT IN LABOR DISPUTEs 68 (1932).
'5 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
Ii Id. at 469.
'7 Id. at 471-72. Congress subsequently overruled the Court's narrow construction of § 20
with the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932 with its prohibition of injunctions in
cases involving "labor disputes." 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).
"S The situation had actually deteriorated from the union point of view, inasmuch as § 16
of the Clayton Act provided for private injunctive relief where none had been available before.
Dissenting in Duplex, Mr. Justice Brandeis remarked:
The conditions developed in industry may be such that those engaged in it
cannot continue their struggle without danger to the community. But it is not for
judges to determine whether such conditions exist, nor is it their function to set the
limits of permissible contest and to declare the duties which the new situation de-
mands. This is the function of the legislature which, while limiting individual and
group rights of aggression and defense, may substitute processes of justice for the
more primitive method of trial by combat.
254 U.S. 443, 488 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The rule of the Court in formulating labor policy is roundly condemned in Winter, supra
note 4.
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Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader19 was a significant departure from
preceding cases in terms of the Court's attempt to judicially reconcile
labor and antitrust policies. Confronted with a situation in which
union members had committed acts of violence against their struck
employer's plant and had physically prevented the release of goods
destined for interstate shipment, the Court dismissed any argument
that unions enjoyed an absolute exemption from the Sherman Act.'"
However, the Court observed that inasmuch as the Sherman Act was
not a tool for the regulation of the interstate transportation of goods,
the question became:
[Wlhether a conspiracy of strikers in a labor dispute to stop the
operation of the employer's factory in order to enforce their de-
mands against the employer is the kind of restraint of trade or
commerce at which the Act is aimed, even though a natural and
probable consequence of their acts and the only effect on trade or
commerce was to prevent substantial shipments interstate by the
employer.2
A survey of the legislative history of the Sherman Act convinced
the Apex Court that the antitrust laws were designed to prevent
"restraints to free competition in business and commercial transac-
tions which tended to restrict production, raise prices or otherwise
control the market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of
goods and services .... ,,22 But this formula, standing alone, would
allow antitrust proscriptions to encompass virtually all union organi-
zational and bargaining activity. It is elementary that the success of
a strike or boycott depends largely upon the extent of economic injury
such devices cause a particular employer. Thus, the struck employer
is unable to compete as a result of decreased production; the boycot-
ted employer may be able to produce, but his competitive position is
damaged by his inability to market his goods. Similarly, the satisfac-
tion of union demands for improved wages, hours and working condi-
tions is generally manifested by an increase in the price of unionized
goods.
However, the Apex Court observed that:
[s]ince, in order to render a labor combination effective it must
eliminate the competition from non-union made goods, . . .an
elimination of price competition based on differences in labor stan-
310 U.S. 469 (1940).
o Id. at 487-88.
21 Id. at 487 (emphasis added).
2 Id. at 493.
NOTES
dards is the objective of any national labor organization. But this
effect on competition has not been considered to be the kind of
curtailment of price competition prohibited by the Sherman Act. 2
The Court's conclusion was supported by citations to various legisla-
tive schemes that indicated congressional approval for the elimina-
tion of labor market competition by establishing industry wide stan-
dards through collective bargaining and legislatively dictated mini-
mum wages and hours.24 "Such combinations and standards," said
the Court, did not have the kind of effect on competition that was
condemned by the Sherman Act.?
Yet the Court determined that no antitrust violation was in-
volved in Apex since the object and purpose of the union was not to
restrain competition in the employer's product,26 suggesting that
union intent was somehow material. Despite the Court's acknowl-
edgement of congressional approval for collective bargaining combi-
nations, earlier cases involving unlawful combinations of business-
men using a labor organization as a means of suppressing competi-
tionnl were carefully distinguished.
Questions of union intent were apparently disregarded in the
following year by the Court's decision in United States v.
Hutcheson.21 The union in Hutcheson had resorted to strikes against
several employers and encouraged product boycotts in an effort to
support its position in a jurisdictional dispute. In determining that the
union's activities did not violate the Sherman Act, the Court could
have exclusively employed the Apex standard.29 Instead the Court
fashioned a broad labor exemption from antitrust sanctions by read-
ing the Sherman, Clayton, and Norris-LaGuardia Acts "as a harmo-
nizing text of outlawry of labor conduct."3 The result was that:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with
non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit under § 20 [of the Clayton
Act] are not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the
wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or
2 Id. at 503-04.
24 Id. at 504 n. 24.
2 Id.
11 Id. at 506.
21 Local 167, Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293 (1934); United States v. Brims,
272 U.S. 549 (1926). See notes 41-46, 91-96 and accompanying text, infra.
2- 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
25 See Bernhardt, The Allen Bradley Doctrine: An Accommodation of Conflicting
Policies, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1094, 1096 (1962). Justice Stone would have relied exclusively on
Apex for the Hutcheson result. 312 U.S. at 242.
11 312 U.S. at 231.
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unselfishness of the end of which the particular union activities are
the means."
The Court cited United States v. Brims32-as it had in
Apex33-as an example of the kind of combination of labor and
nonlabor interests that would still constitute an unlawful restraint of
trade under the Sherman Act. The "conspiracy" 34 in Brims,
however, appeared to be little more than a "hot-cargo" agreement
between union and employer that union employees were not to work
on nonunion goods.35 Further, the agreement employed by the union
to protect its wage scale against the competitive pressures created by
the presence of nonunion goods in the market was simply one means
of achieving traditional union goals as recognized by the Court in
Apex.36
The combination with the non-labor qualification of the
Hutcheson standard was given substance in Allen-Bradley Co. v.
Local 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.37 Local
3, in an effort to obtain improved wages and working conditions for
its members, actively sought closed-shop agreements from electrical
manufacturers and contractors within the New York City area.
Under the union plan, electrical manufacturers agreed to sell and
contractors agreed to install only electrical goods that were within the
jurisdiction of Local 3. These union demands were enforced by such
conventional union methods as strikes and boycotts. 8 The effect of
the campaign was to wholly suppress the sale within the New York
City area of electrical equipment by non-local manufacturers. 9 The
business of local manufacturers and contractors grew substantially,
as did the wages of the union employees. Labor prices for electrical
goods and services were substantially increased as well.
Despite the fact that the impetus for the Allen-Bradley scheme
was largely the result of union pressures," the Supreme Court chose
11 Id. at 232 (citation omitted).
272 U.S. 549 (1926).
310 U.S. 469, 501 (1940).
11 "Conspiracy" was the characterization made by the Hutcheson Court. 312 U.S. at 232
n. 3.
35 See United States v. Brims, 272 U.S. 549, 552 (1926). As characterized by the Brims
Court, the exclusionary agreements were apparently instigated by the defendant-manufacturers,
and not the union. Cf Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Electrical Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 800-01
(1945). Cf National Labor Relations Act § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970).
14 Winter, supra note 4, at 41.
37 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
11 Id. at 799.
3' Id. at 800.
40 See Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Electrical Workers, 41 F. Supp. 727, 728, 741-43,
NOTES
to characterize the resulting economic restraints as a business monop-
oly in violation of the Sherman Act. The question was whether the
union's involvement and the scope of the union's exemption from the
antitrust laws were sufficient to immunize all the parties to the
scheme.4' The Court observed that, had there been no combination
with the New York manufacturers and contractors, the Clayton and
Norris-LaGuardia Acts would have precluded a finding that Local 3
had violated the Sherman Act. But this was not the case when unions
"aid[ed] and abet[ted] business men who [were] violating the Act:' 42
"we think Congress never intended that unions could, consistently
with the Sherman Act, aid non-labor groups to create business mo-
nopolies and to control the marketing of goods and services."43
The determination that Local 3 had violated the Sherman Act
resulted from the Court's attempt to reconcile congressional policies
seeking to "preserve a competitive business economy" as well as to
"preserve the rights of labor to organize to better its conditions
through the agency of collective bargaining."" The Allen-Bradley
opinion, while mentioning the importance of collective bargaining in
the federal labor scheme, did virtually nothing to delineate the non-
violative scope of such agreements. This question was of crucial im-
portance in view of the Court's holding that "the same labor union
activities may or may not be in violation of the Sherman Act, depen-
dent upon whether the union acts alone or in combination with busi-
ness groups,"" and the fact that, acting pursuant to the provisions
750 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
4' 325 U.S. at 800-01 (footnote)
Quite obviously, this combination of business men has violated both §§ I and 2
of the Sherman Act, unless its conduct is immunized by the participation of the
union. For it intended to and did restrain trade in and monopolize the supply of
electrical equipment in the New York City area to the exclusion of equipment
manufactured in and shipped from other states, and did also control its price and
discriminate between its would-be customers . .. Our problem in this case is there-
fore a very narrow one-do labor unions violate the Sherman Act when, in order to
further their own interests as wage earners, they aid and abet business men to do
the precise things which the Act prohibits?
The Allen-Bradley Court's mischaracterization of the facts apparently led some to con-
clude that an independent business conspiracy, directed towards employer benefit, was neces-
sary before a union could be subjected to antitrust liability. See United States v. Hamilton
Glass Co., 155 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. III. 1957); California Sportswear & Dress Ass'n, 54 F.T.C.
835, 839 (1957). See also Bernhardt, The Allen Bradley Doctrine: An Accommodation of
Conflicting Policies, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 1094, 1098-1000 (1962).
42 Id. at 807.
3 Id. at 808.
11 Id. at 806.
11 Id. at 810.
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of a collective bargaining agreement, a union is never acting
"alone."46
Union-employer agreements were attacked again in United
Mine Workers v. Pennington47 and Local 189, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.4" Three groups of three justices each wrote
three opinions in arriving at the plurality decisions in Jewel Tea, and
in Pennington.4
The controversy in Pennington arose following alleged attempts
by the UMW and large coal producers to force smaller coal operators
from the market. The result of this drive was to reduce competition
and enable the large producers to institute more efficient and profita-
ble production techniques. The union was to realize coincidental
gains in the form of increased wages for its members, even though
the elimination of the marginal producers and the institution of
streamlined production techniques would result in an actual reduction
in the number of available jobs. In furtherance of the plan, the union
agreed to impose the terms of its wage agreement on all industry
operators irrespective of their ability to pay.5
The Court,5 through Mr. Justice White, held that the union's
conduct was not exempt from antitrust liability. Justice White reaf-
firmed the Hutcheson-Allen-Bradley principle that unions became
subject to Sherman Act liability when they combined with nonlabor
groups. 52 He further suggested that even if a union were pursuing its
own self-interest, the union could not require an employer to agree
to terms that amounted to a direct restraint on the product market
48 Compare Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 (1945); Weir v. Chicago Plastering Institute,
272 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1959), with American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99 (1968).
The Carroll case is the most current example of unilateral-and therefore, antitrust-
exempt-union conduct. See Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100,
421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975). But the result in Carroll turned, in part, on the characterization of
orchestra leaders as a labor group for purposes of applying the Hutcheson-Allen-Bradley
standard. 391 U.S. at 105-06. Mr. Justice White, dissenting, pointed out that the leaders,
because of the nature of their work, could easily have been characterized as a nonlabor group,
which in turn would have raised questions as to the legality of the minimum-price floor and
other restrictions imposed on them by the union under the Sherman Act. 391 U.S. at 114-22.
47 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
- 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
11 However, the opinions of Mr. Justice White's group and Mr. Justice Douglas' group,
which constituted the opinion of the Pennington Court, appeared to rest on substantially
different theories. See Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws,
32 U. CHi. L. REv. 659, 720 (1965).
- 381 U.S. 657, 659-61 (1965).
5' See note 49, supra. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan joined in the opinion.
52 381 U.S. at 662.
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and that yielded comparatively little in the way of union benefits.53
Finally, Justice White found that national labor policies offered no
protection for union-employer agreements within a single "bargain-
ing unit" that attempted to establish standards for other units.54
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas felt that
Pennington was a reaffirmation of the business-conspiracy theory of
Allen-Bradley. However, he then broadly asserted that an industry-
wide agreement involving a wage scale that exceeded some operators'
ability to pay would establish a prima facie violation of the antitrust
laws. Emphasizing this standard, Justice Douglas pointed out that an
unlawful conspiracy may be formed without simultaneous action or
agreement on the part of the conspirators.55
The employer-plaintiff in Jewel Tea originally had been a mem-
ber of a multi-employer group involved in contract negotiations with
representatives of the Chicago Area Meat Cutters Union. After the
multi-employer unit acceded to union demands that the employers
strictly limit the hours of operation of local markets, Jewel Tea and
another firm left the unit. Later, when faced with a strike vote by the
union, Jewel agreed to the marketing hours restrictions. Soon there-
after, Jewel brought suit against the union and the multi-employer
unit, charging that the two groups had conspired to prevent the night
sale of meat by Jewel and had thereby deprived the company of the
" Id. at 666. In reaching this conclusion Justice White sought to distinguish a union-
imposed agreement fixing wages from one fixing prices, and suggested that the former was
protected from antitrust attack inasmuch as it had a direct and concrete effect in the elimination
of competition based on labor standards, as approved in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader. Id. at
664. See notes 19-27, supra, and accompanying text. However, the test of validity of such a
provision was not its form but whether it represented a "direct frontal attack upon a problem
thought to threaten the maintenance of the basic wage structure." Local No. 189, Amalgam-
ated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 690 n. 5 (1965), citing Teamsters Union v.
Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 294 (1959). See American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99,
115-18 (1968) (White, J., dissenting). In both Carroll and Oliver, the Court upheld agreements
establishing minimum prices to be charged to customers. The pricing agreements were seen as
the only effective method of protecting the wage scales of union members. Cf. Meat Drivers
Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94, 98 (1962); Milk Wagon Drivers' Local 753 v. Lake Valley
Farm Products, Inc., 311 U.S. 91 (1940).
One major difficulty with Justice White's approach is that it requires courts to supplant
the union's judgment regarding the effectiveness of a particular union demand in protecting its
wage scale. This judgment, in turn, would appear to depend on a determination of the reasona-
bleness of the particular restraint. Yet it was this very kind of judicial balancing which, within
the context of a union acting alone, was expressly prohibited by Hutcheson. See Cox, Labor
and the Antitrust Laws: Pennington and Jewel Tea, 46 B.U.L. REv. 317, 327 (1966).
381 U.S. at 666.
" Id. at 672-73, citing Schenck v. United States, 253 F. 212, 213 (E.D. Pa.), affd 249
U.S. 47 (1919); Levey v. United States, 92 F.2d 688, 691 (9th Cir. 1937). Justice Douglas was
joined by Justices Black and Clark.
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benefits of its self-service operations.56
The trial court specifically found that absent the marketing
hours restriction, union butchers would have been required to work
longer hours or relinquish traditional work to unskilled labor.5 Ac-
cepting this finding, Justice White saw the restriction as so "inti-
mately related" to the mandatory bargaining subjects of wages,
hours, and working conditions" as to fall within the protection of the
national labor policy favoring collective bargaining.59 But he added
that the product market restraint resulting from the exclusion of self-
service markets from night operations would not necessarily be held
exempt from antitrust liability had it been shown that the marketing
hours restriction was unnecessary for the protection of the butchers'
interests.6 0
The plurality decision in Jewel Tea was obtained with the con-
curring opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg's group. After reviewing the
history of labor's exemption from the antitrust laws, Justice Goldberg
criticized Justice White's opinion as a narrow judicial limitation on
the importance of mandatory bargaining subjects based on their sup-
posed importance to individual workers. Justice Goldberg favored
allowing an exemption for all collective agreements dealing with
mandatory subjects in view of the overriding union interest in these
subjects. But he indicated that no exemption should be extended to
agreements covering nonmandatory subjects."
III. Connell
A. The Facts
Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 100 represented workers in the
plumbing and mechanical trades in Dallas, Texas. Local 100 was
party to a collective bargaining agreement with the Mechanical Con-
tractors Association, a multi-employer "bargaining unit" represent-
ing about seventy-five area mechanical contractors. Included in the
collective agreement was a "most favored nation" clause, whereby
the union agreed that, should it enter into a more favorable agree-
ment with any other employer, it would extend the same terms to all
Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 680-82 (1965).
' Jewel Tea Co. v. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 215 F. Supp. 839, 846 (N.D.
II1. 1963).
" See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3), (d) (1970).
381 U.S. at 689-90.
Id. at 692-93. See note 53, supra.
" 381 U.S. at 732-33. Justice Goldberg was joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart.
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members of the Association.62
As part of its efforts to organize mechanical subcontractors in
the area,63 Local 100 approached the Connell Construction Com-
pany, a general building contractor in Dallas. The Local requested
Connell to agree that, when subcontracting work fell within the juris-
diction of the union, Connell would subcontract such work only to
firms party to a current collective bargaining agreement with Local
100.64 The union, however, expressed no interest in representing Con-
nell's employees. Connell refused to agree, and the union picketed
one of the contractor's major construction sites, causing many of the
workers to leave the job and thereby halting construction. Connell
subsequently signed the agreement, under protest, and sought a fed-
eral court declaration that the agreement violated §§ I and 2 of the
Sherman Act. But the District Court" found the agreement exempt
from antitrust attack, inasmuch as such an agreement appeared to
be authorized by the express terms of the construction industry prov-
iso in § 8(e)66 of the National Labor Relations Act. The Fifth Circuit
62 Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 619
(1975).
Id. at 618.
" Id. at 619-20. The subcontracting agreement provided as follows:
WHEREAS, the contractor and the union are engaged in the construction
industry, and WHEREAS, the contractor and the union desire to make an agree-
ment applying in the event of subcontracting in accordance with Section 8(e) of the
Labor-Management Relations Act; WHEREAS, it is understood that by this agree-
ment the contractor does not grant, nor does the union seek, recognition as the
collective bargaining representative of any employees of the signatory contractor;
and WHEREAS, it is further understood that the subcontracting limitation provided
herein applies only to mechanical work which the contractor does not perform with
his own employees but uniformly subcontracts to other firms; THEREFORE, the
contractor and the union mutually agree with respect to work falling within the scope
of this agreement that is to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting
or repair of any building, structure, or other works, that [if] the contractor should
contract or subcontract afny of the aforesaid work falling within the normal trade
jurisdiction of the union, said contractor shall contract or subcontract such work only
to firms that are parties to an executed, current collective bargaining agreement with
Local Union 100 of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the
Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry. (emphasis added).
" Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 100, 78 L.R.R.M. 3012
(N.D. Tex. 1971).
66 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970):
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer
to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, trans-
porting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease
doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into
heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenfor-
cible and void: Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall apply to an agreement
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affirmed. 7
The Supreme Court reversed. In a five to four decision and an
opinion that established no clear rationale for the result reached, the
Court held that Local 100's activities were not exempt from the
Sherman Act. The Court acknowledged the statutory exemption ac-
corded unions under Hutcheson by virtue of the interaction of the
Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts. Pennington was cited for the
broad proposition that those statutes "do not exempt concerted ac-
tion or agreements between unions and non-labor parties." This char-
acterization of Pennington was tempered by the Court's citation to
Jewel Tea for the further proposition that "a proper accommodation
between the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining under
the NLRA and the congressional policy favoring free competition in
business markets requires that some union-employer agreements be
accorded a limited nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanc-
tions."6"
The nonstatutory exemption, said the Court, was grounded upon
the recognition that a labor policy favoring the organization of em-
ployees to eliminate wage competition would ultimately affect price
competition as well. However, this was not to say that a union had
freedom to impose "direct restraints on competition among those
who employ its members."69 The Court observed that:
In this case Local 100 used direct restraints on the business
market to support its organizing campaign. The agreements with
Connell and other general contractors indiscriminately excluded
nonunion subcontractors from a portion of the market, even if their
competitive advantages were not derived from substandard wages
or working conditions but rather from more efficient operating
between a labor organization and an employer in the construction industry relating
to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construc-
tion, alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other work; Provided
further. That for the purposes of this subsection and subsection (b)(4)(B) of this
section the terms "any employer", "any person engaged in commerce or an industry
affecting commerce", and "any person" when used in relation to the terms "any
other producer, processor, or manufacturer", "any other employer", or "any other
person" shall not include persons in the relation of the jobber, manufacturer, con-
tractor, or subcontractor working on the goods or premises of the jobber or manufac-
turer or performing parts of an integrated process of production in the apparel and
clothing industry: Provided further, that nothing in this subchapter shall prohibit the
enforcement of any agreement which is within the foregoing exception. (emphasis
added).
11 Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 483 F.2d 1154 (5th
Cir. 1973).
1s 421 U.S. at 622.
59 Id.
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methods. Curtailment of competition based on efficiency is neither
a goal of federal labor policy nor a necessary effect of the elimina-
tion of competition among workers. Moreover, competition based
on efficiency is a positive value that the antitrust laws strive to
protect.70
In addition, the "most favored nation" agreement between
Local 100 and the multi-employer unit, although not directly at-
tacked, was deemed relevant by the Court in determining the effect
that the.subcontracting agreement would have on the business mar-
ket. By giving the members of the multi-employer unit a contractual
right to insist that the union impose comparable terms on competi-
tors, members of the unit were assured that no subsequent agreement
would give other employers a competitive advantage. Further, the
method of Local 100's organization had the effect of sheltering mem-
bers of the unit from outside competition in that portion of the mar-
ket covered by subcontracting agreements between general contrac-
tors and the union. 71
The Court also found objectionable the apparent power of the
union, pursuant to the subcontracting agreement, to control access
to the mechanical subcontracting market:
The agreements with general contractors did not simply prohibit
subcontracting to any nonunion firm; they prohibited
subcontracting to any firm that did not have a contract with Local
100. The union thus had complete control over subcontract work
offered by general contractors that signed these agreements. Such
control could result in significant adverse effects on the market and
on consumers-effects unrelated to the union's legitimate goal of
organizing workers and standardizing working conditions.72
Despite its disapproval, however, the Court was quick to recog-
nize that there had been no indication that the union's goal was
anything other than organizing as many subcontractors as possible.
Although this goal was legal, and although the effect of any successful
organizational campaign would reduce the competition from non-
union firms, the Court nevertheless found Local 100's methods sub-
ject to antitrust attack. That is, by agreement, the union had made
non-union subcontractors ineligible to compete for available work. 73
Finally, accompanied by citations to the opinion in Pennington
and Jewel Tea, the Court said:
I ld. at 623.
I' d. at 625.
72 Id. at 624.
7 Id. at 625.
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There can be no argument in this case, whatever its force in
other contexts, that a restraint of this magnitude might be entitled
to an antitrust exemption if it were included in a lawful collective-
bargaining agreement. . . . In this case, Local 100 had no interest
in representing Connell's employees. The federal policy favoring
collective bargaining therefore can offer no shelter for the union's
coercive action against Connell or its campaign to exclude nonunion
firms from the subcontracting market. 74 "
B. The Section 8(e) Question
The District Court had agreed with Local 100's contention that
its subcontracting agreement was within the express terms of the
construction industry proviso to § 8(e) of the NLRA. The Supreme
Court, after giving that proviso a narrow construction, disagreed. The
Court was concerned that a literal adherence to the proviso's lan-
guage could provide unions with a powerful organizational tool that
would violate the spirit, if not the express terms, of other provisions
of the NLRA.75 Rather than allow the construction industry proviso
to be used to frustrate the organizational policy expressed by the
other provisions, the Court said:
[the proviso's] authorization extends only to agreements in the con-
text of collective-bargaining relationships and . . . possibly to
common-situs relationships on particular jobsites as well.76
What the Court termed a possibility apparently became a certainty
in that the Court ultimately held that Local 100's subcontracting
agreement, which was "outside the context of a collective-bargaining
relationship and not restricted to a particular jobsite," failed to con-
form to the § 8(e) proviso. 77
By so construing the § 8(e) proviso, the Court limited its applica-
tion to agreements between contractors and unions entered into for
the purpose of alleviating the conflicts created by the presence of
union and nonunion workers on the same construction site.7 Local
71 Id. at 625-26.
75 Id. at 632-33. Specifically, § 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1970), prohibits "top-down"
organizational campaigns whereby unions picket an employer to force recognition, regardless
of the wishes of his employees. See also 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (secondary tactics in organiza-
tional campaigns). Cf 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (allowing "prehire" agreements in the construction
industry). See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 634 (1967).
11 421 U.S. at 633 (emphasis added).
' Id. at 635 (emphasis added).
11 See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 638-39 (1967); NLRB
v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692-93 (1951) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Drivers Local 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 547, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Essex County &
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100's subcontracting agreement with Connell, however, was found to
be unrelated to the objective of insulating its members against a
nonunion presence. The agreement was not limited to jobsites on
which union members were working; it allowed free subcontracting
of work not performed by its members, without regard for the possi-
bility that other work might be done by nonunion subcontractors.
The union was not trying to organize a nonunion subcontractor on
the site it picketed.79 Finally, Local 100 had admitted that the sole
purpose of the agreement was the organization of other mechanical
subcontractors.8 0
Although the agreement constituted a violation of § 8(e), the
Court refused to restrict Connell's remedies to those exclusively pro-
vided in the NLRA.8 ' The Court found unpersuasive the argument
of the four dissenting justices 2 that congressional rejection of legisla-
tive attempts to impose antitrust sanctions for union secondary activ-
ity indicated a congressional intent to make the NLRA remedies
exclusive. 3 Instead, the majority found no indication that "Congress
thought allowing antitrust remedies in cases like the present one
would be inconsistent with the remedial scheme of the NLRA." 84
IV. Connell AND PRIOR LAW
Although Connell gives literal effect to the combination with
nonlabor exception of Hutcheson, the case fails to establish reliable
criteria for defining the magnitude of market restraints that are suffi-
cient to allow antitrust policy to override the regulatory scheme of
the federal labor statutes. Further, given the fact that Connell does
not preclude the possibility of antitrust liability for market restraints
that coincidentally involve violations of the NLRA, it is clear that
the Court is not giving the provisions of the NLRA and other federal
labor provisions the kind of conclusive effect given the Norris-
LaGuardia Act in Hutcheson.85 Indeed, prior to Connell, at least one
commentator had observed that despite Congress' apparent attempt
to allow NLRA provisions to regulate certain labor conduct, which
Vicinity District Council of Carpenters v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 636, 640 (3d Cir. 1964).
11 421 U.S. at 631.
Id.
' See 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1970) (providing action to recover actual damages for injury
resulting from violation of secondary-boycott provisions).
' Justices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall.
See 421 U.S. at 645-46.
Id. at 634.
Cf Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 710-13
(1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 504 n. 24 (1940).
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had been found to violate the Sherman Act in early Supreme Court
cases, violations of the NLRA provisions were not dependent on the
benefits received by employer groups, and § 8(e) in particular failed
to reach practices constituting direct restraints on the product mar-
ket. 6 The point is crucial since Connell deemed the remedial provi-
sions of the NLRA irrelevant for purposes of allowing or disallowing
a labor-business combination an exemption from the antitrust laws. 7
Rather, in cases involving such combinations-including collective-
bargaining agreements-the test appears to be whether sufficient
labor interests are involved so as to outweigh the anticompetitive
restraints which may flow from such a combination."8 The test of
exemption does not depend upon whether the parties to the combina-
tion conspired among themselves to eliminate competition but
whether the market restraints are justified. In contrast, the allegation
in Pennington, along with Justice Douglas' concurrence, suggested
that the answer to the exemption question was determined by the
predatory intent of the parties. 9 A claimed purpose of the agreement
between the UMW and the large coal producers was the elimination
of marginal producers through the union's imposition of contract
terms which the smaller producers would be unable to meet. How-
U Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHI. L.
REV. 659, 702 (1965). Thus in regulating secondary activities by a union § 8(b)(4) and § 8(e)
reach only those union-employer agreements the tactical objective of which reaches beyond the
immediate employer-employee relationship. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386
U.S. 612, 644-45 (1967). See Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of
NLRA §§ 8(b)(4) and 8(e), 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1000, 1040 (1965). However, these regulatory
provisions do not directly address themselves to questions of economic benefit to employer
groups. But see Sovern, Some Ruminations on Labor, The Antitrust Laws and Allen-Bradley,
13 LAB. L.J. 957, 963 (1962).
In this regard, compare those applications of § 8(b)(4) to union attempts to obtain conces-
sions for a specific group of employees from an employer with whom it has no bargaining
relationship relating to those specific employees. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 825, Operating
Engineers, 400 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1971); Local 814, Teamsters v. NLRB, 512 F.2d 564 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); Carpet Layers Local 419 v. NLRB, 467 F.2d 392 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Retail Clerks
Local 1288 v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See Plumbers and Steamfitters Local
638 v. NLRB, 89 LRRM 2769, 2786-89 (D.C. Cir. July 1, 1975) (Bazelon, J., concurring). See
notes 93-101 and accompanying text, infra.
11 Thus, in juxtaposing the questions of whether an antitrust exemption existed and
whether § 8(e) had been violated, the Connell Court's order of reasoning was (1) no antitrust
exemption exists in this case, and then (2) the union violated § 8(e). Arguably, judicial deference
to the NLRA would have required that the order of the conclusions be reversed. See also Mr.
Justice White's Pennington opinion, wherein he concludes that even agreements on mandatory
bargaining subjects might not be exempt from the antitrust laws. United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664-65 (1965).
11 See notes 93-109 and accompanying text, infra.
" See Lewis v. Pennington, 257 F. Supp. 815, 829 (E.D. Tenn. 1966). Cf Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University v. Ross Aviation, Inc., 504 F.2d 896, 903 (5th Cir. 1974).
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ever, the "most favored nation" agreement between the Contractors
Association and Local 100, which arguably might have been the sub-
ject of Connell's antitrust attack, 90 was only of secondary importance
to the Court, which saw the clause as relevant in determining the
anticompetitive effects of the subcontracting agreement betveen the
union and Connell. 91
More peculiar is the fact that, in denying Local 100 an antitrust
exemption, the Court invoked the combination with nonlabor for-
mula within a factual context markedly different from that of prior
cases. Connell was attacking its own agreement with the union, an
agreement from which Connell was obviously receiving nothing of
economic benefit. However, since Apex, Supreme Court decisions
justified the condemnation of union-employer combinations in part
because of the fear that employers would use the union and its anti-
trust immunity to achieve anticompetitive ends which the employer
acting alone could not legally effect.9" This concern over the potential
for employer abuse of the union's exemption was also manifested by
Justice White's disapproval in Pennington of the extent to which the
UMW had conditioned its independence upon the desires of the
major coal producers. 9
And yet the Court in Connell was willing to disallow an antitrust
exemption absent any claim of conspiracy or other conduct indicating
some nexus between the union's conduct and a corresponding em-
ployer benefit. Rather, the mere act of combining was sufficient to
allow an inquiry into the anticompetitive aspects of the subcontract-
ing agreement. But to the extent that the facts in Connell fail to
support either an inference of benefit to the nonlabor party to the
agreement or an indication that the union had somehow bargained
N At the trial, Local 100's business agent testified that the effect of the clause was to
preclude the union from entering an agreement with terms differing from those of the agree-
ment between the union and the contractors' association. 421 U.S. at 623-24 n.l. At the very
least such a contractual restriction would appear to subject the union to antitrust liability based
on the Pennington Court's disapproval of union-employer agreements to impose pre-arranged
standards on employer-employee units which were not represented during the original
negotiations. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1965). Pennington
would also render the clause suspect in that the union had arguably bargained away its ability
to respond on a "unit by unit" basis to the needs of its members. Id.
1 Indeed, the absence in Connell's complaint of any allegation of a conspiracy involving
the members of the Contractors' Association and Local 100 moved Justice Douglas to espe-
cially dissent. 421 U.S. 616, 638 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
92 See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 501 (1940); Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local
3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 800-01 (1945); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657,
665-66 (1965). Cf. Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S.
616, 623-24 (1975) ("most-favored-nation" clause).
13 United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 668 (1965).
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away its independence, 4 the existence of the Connell-Local 100 com-
bination became a mere technicality to justify the Court's scrutiny of
the union imposed subcontracting agreement. Thus, the Court in
Connell arguably did little more than adopt a balancing test to deter-
mine the desirability of the union's conduct, a test which United
States v. Hutcheson supposedly precludes. 5
After a union-employer combination was established, the Court
deferred to the federal policy favoring collective bargaining to deter-
mine whether an exemption would be allowed. The Court indicated
that, had Local 100 been interested in representing Connell's employ-
ees, the presence of a collective bargaining relationship might have
allowed an exemption from the antitrust laws. 7 This qualifying
"maybe" is troublesome, for both Pennington and Allen-Bradley
made it clear that mere representational status is insufficient to pro-
tect a union from antitrust attack. Connell, therefore, indicates that
the kind of representational relationship between a union and an
employer will determine whether an exemption exists.
The opinions of Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Goldberg in
Pennington and Jewel Tea, to which the Connell Court referred, offer
some guidance on this point. In Pennington, Justice White observed
that a union might conclude a wage agreement with a multi-employer
unit without violating the antitrust laws. However,
[t]his is not to say that an agreement resulting from union-
employer negotiations is automatically exempt from Sherman Act
scrutiny simply because the negotiations involve a compulsory sub-
ject of bargaining, regardless of the subject or the form and content
of the agreement . . . . [T]here are limits to what a union or em-
ployer may offer or extract in the name of wages, and because they
must bargain does not mean that the agreement reached may disre-
gard other laws.9
The notion that a statutorily compelled union-employer agree-
ment on mandatory subjects might simultaneously violate the Sher-
man Act disturbed Mr. Justice Goldberg, who would have allowed
an exemption to flow naturally from bargaining activity concerning
11 For example, the only arguable restriction imposed by the subcontracting agreement on
Local 100's conduct was an understanding that the union was not seeking to represent Connell's
employees. See note 64, supra.
11 See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941).
96 421 U.S. at 625-26.
U Id.
" United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664-65 (1965) (emphasis added).
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mandatory subjects." However, the opinions of the two justices ap-
pear reconcilable to a limited degree. Justice White in Pennington
addressed himself to the impact of an agreement concerning wages,
which by its terms would be applied not only to the immediate union-
employer "unit" but others as well, even though the employers and
their employees in the other "units" had not been parties to the
original agreement. Justice White observed:
[T]here is nothing in the labor policy indicating that the union and
the employers in one bargaining unit are free to bargain about the
wages, hours and working conditions of other bargaining units or
to settle these matters for the entire industry. On the contrary, the
duty to bargain unit by unit leads to a quite different conclusion.
The union's obligation to its members would seem best served if the
union retained the ability to respond to each bargaining situation
as the individual circumstances might warrant without being strait-
jacketed by some prior agreement with the favored employers.",
Justice White's suggestion that the individual interests of union mem-
bers were undercut by the union's "extra unit" agreement with the
large coal producers was similar to the approach taken by Justice
Goldberg in extending an exemption to mandatory bargaining sub-
jects. Justice Goldberg indicated that the "direct and overriding inter-
est of unions" 10 1 in the subject of wages, hours, and working
conditions prompted Congress to specifically recognize them as sub-
jects of mandatory bargaining. As such, agreements involving non-
mandatory subjects, in which unions had no such interest, were be-
yond the congressional bargaining mandate and thus not entitled to
an antitrust exemption.'
The Connell Court cited the opinions of both justices in discuss-
ing the effect of a collective bargaining relationship in sheltering
union-employer agreements from antitrust attack. Taken together,
the White and Goldberg opinions indicate that collective agreements
on mandatory subjects, negotiated by an employer (or multi-
employer unit)03 and a union representing an identifiable "unit"'' 0
1, Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 710 (1965)
(Goldberg, J.).
'0 381 U.S. at 666 (emphasis added).
"D! Id. at 732-33 (emphasis added).
to2 Further, a union commits an unfair labor practice when it insists on bargaining over
nonmandatory subjects. NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342
(1958).
101 See 381 U.S. at 664, 665.
'1 "Unit" as it appears in quotes refers to an individual labor-management bargaining
group and is to be distinguished from the technical meaning of that term as defined in the
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of employees, are exempt from the Sherman Act to the extent that
the terms of the agreement apply only to the negotiating employers
and the employees making up the identifiable "unit." This result is
suggested in that, while Justice White recognized the interests of
union members in unit by unit bargaining and mandatory bargaining
subjects, Justice Goldberg focused on the interests of the union in
mandatory subjects. Presumably, the interests of both unions and
union members would be satisfied within the context of an individual
bargaining unit comprised of the employers who are party to the
agreement and their employees, whose interests will be immediately
affected by the terms of an agreement on mandatory subjects. Thus
since Local 100 was not seeking to represent Connell's employees,
and since the subcontracting agreement incidentally constituted a
direct restraint on competition, no antitrust exemption was available.
This analysis of the antitrust exemption also seems consistent
with the narrow reading which the Connell Court gave to the con-
struction industry proviso of § 8(e) and the Court's holding that reme-
dies for a violation of that section were not limited to those provided
by the NLRA.0° Just as mandatory subjects of bargaining protect
employee interests in general, the construction industry proviso was
deemed to protect the interests of unionized construction workers in
not having to work alongside nonunion workers at the same construc-
tion site. However, the subcontracting agreement in Connell failed to
recognize these interests and, further, was organizational in its pur-
pose. Thus not only did Local 100 fail to represent employee jobsite
interests as recognized by the § 8(e) proviso; the union was also unable
to protect any organizational interests manifested by the NLRA since
that Act is neutral with respect to the desirability of unionization.,"6
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), (b) (1970).
"I See notes 81-84 and accompanying text, supra.
116 Thus § 7 of the NLRA provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employ-
ment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) (emphasis added).
In contrast, the garment industry proviso to § 8(e) 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970) has been
interpreted as manifesting the intent of Congress to allow garment workers' unions the use of
subcontracting agreements as organizational weapons. Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers
and Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 633 n.13 (1975); Danielson v. ILGWU Joint Board,
494 F.2d 1230 (2d Cir. 1974).
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This balancing of employee interests against competitive re-
straints appears to explain the paradox of the Court's refusal in
Connell to grant an antitrust exemption despite its recognition that
a legal union organizational campaign would reduce competition as
surely as one whose methods were illegal. In Jewel Tea, Justice White
looked to the interests of union members in determining that the
union-employer agreement limiting the marketing hours of self-
service butcher shops was entitled to an exemption. His rationale for
the exemption was that the marketing hours provision was essential
to preserve union butchers' hours of work and to prevent butchers'
jobs from being performed by unskilled labor.107 As such, the market-
ing hours provision was "so intimately related to wages, hours, and
working conditions" that it fell within the protection of the national
labor policy and therefore was exempt from the Sherman Act.0 8 This
conclusion resulted from a consideration of the "relative impact" of
the agreement on the product market and the "interests of union
members.""' Similarly, the denial of an exemption in Connell ap-
pears to have resulted from the Court's conclusion that the legitimate
interests of union members were insufficiently represented by the
subcontracting agreement in order to justify the anticompetitive re-
straints placed on nonunion subcontractors."'
The lack of justification compelled the Court to conclude that
the restriction on subcontracting was directed not towards the re-
moval of labor standards from competition but towards the use of
labor standards in order to regulate competitive opportunities in the
subcontracting market."' Similarly, Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader rec-
ognized that the use of labor standards by a union-employer combi-
nation for the sole purpose of eliminating price competition was not
exempt from antitrust attack."2 But the difficulty with this justifica-
tion approach based on a consideration of the interests of union
members (as formulated by Justice White in Pennington and Jewel
Tea) is that, in balancing those interests against the resulting anti-
competitive restraints, the Court espouses the very objectives test
specifically rejected in Hutcheson."3
381 U.S. at 682-83.
105 Id. at 689-90.
I" d. at 690 n. 5, 692-93.
1,0 421 U.S. at 625.
"' Cf. Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws: Pennington and Jewel Tea, 46 B.U.L. REv.
317, 322 (1966).
112 310 U.S. 469, 501, 506, 511-12 (1940).
"1 See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941). Cf text accompanying
notes 92-95, supra.
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As such, Connell's holding that violations of § 8(e) may properly
give rise to an antitrust action is most disturbing. It allows plaintiffs
damaged by arguable § 8(e) violations to have the federal courts first
balance competitive restraints against labor interests to determine
whether the union-employer combination is entitled to an exemption
and then to determine whether § 8(e) was violated." 4 This aspect of
the Connell holding, coupled with the attraction of an award of
treble-damages, could easily presage an influx to federal courts of
cases which would otherwise be within the exclusive province of the
National Labor Relations Board.
With respect to the construction industry itself, Connell gives
little indication as to how unions may effectively prevent the en-
croachment of nonunion labor without sacrificing their exemption
from the antitrust laws. Based on the Court's interpretation of the
§ 8(e) proviso, nonunion labor (and probably rival unions, as well)
may be contractually excluded from particular jobsites if the terms
of the agreement demonstrate an attempt to avoid jobsite frictions,
based on the community of interests standard."' But beyond the
particular jobsite situation, the standards become unclear. For exam-
ple, within a particular locale, a union may often seek short form
agreements from contractors' associations requiring that the associa-
tion members subcontract work only to those firms which are signa-
tories to a collective-bargaining agreement with the unions involved.
Even though such agreements are not necessarily directed towards
organizational ends, as was the case in Connell, they nevertheless
make nonunion firms ineligible to compete for available work. Fur-
thermore, such agreements are not directed to any particular group
of union workers, and would thus appear to violate the Pennington
duty to bargain unit by unit. The safest route for unions in the wake
of Connell would be to enter into union standards agreements, by
which contractors agree that they will subcontract only to firms
whose employees enjoy wages, hours, and working conditions compa-
rable to those of area union workers. Presumably a union and em-
ployer may still remove these labor standards from competition with-
out risking antitrust sanctions."'
V. CONCLUSION
Connell's condemnation of combinations of labor and nonlabor
See note 86, supra.
"' See 421 U.S. at 628-31.
" See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 503-04 (1940).
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groups that restrain business market competition echoes the Court's
opinions in Hutcheson, Allen-Bradley, and Pennington. Unfortun-
ately, the opinion offers no clear standard for distinguishing illegal
restraints from those that would occur as a result of legitimate union
activity. Further, the Court's allowance of an antitrust action for a
violation of § 8(e) would seem to frustrate the centralized regulation
of labor relations by the National Labor Relations Board. And, while
the Hutcheson standard is presumably still valid for cases involving
unilateral union action, the opinion in Connell would nevertheless
require federal courts to balance labor interests against competitive
restraints in determining whether to allow a union-employer combi-
nation an exemption from the Sherman Act.
Further judicial clarification of Connell is essential. But a more
desirable resolution of Connell's ambiguities would be congressional
action to clearly delineate the extent to which antitrust law may
invade the area of collective bargaining. Such legislative action has
been long overdue, for the history of Supreme Court attempts to
reconcile the broad proscriptions of the antitrust laws with the regula-
tory scheme of the labor statutes has demonstrated that the courts
are ill-equipped to perform such a task."1 7
C. Douglas Lovett
"1 See generally, Winter, supra note 4.
